Introduction
This is the second part of an comprehensive essay of the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (CSR thereafter) understood as an extended model of corporate governance and objective function, based on the extension of fiduciary duties owed to the sole owner of the firm to all the company stakeholder (for this definition see part I, Sacconi, 2010a, infra) . As in the first part, CSR is also understood as a self-sustaining institution -i.e. as a self-sustaining system of descriptive and normative beliefs consistent with the equilibrium behaviors performed repeatedly by agents in the domain of action of corporate governance (firms and their stakeholders). But equilibria are multiple in the game representing the strategic interaction among the firm and its stakeholders -modeled as a repeated trust game or some similar 'social dilemma game ' (Ostrom, 1990) . Thus asserting that CSR satisfies the Nash equilibrium condition as an institution is not enough. There is also an equilibrium selection problem. This the place where the Rawlsian social contract (Rawls, 1971 (Rawls, , 1993 enters again the picture by performing its main role as normative equilibrium selection device from the ex ante perspective: that is, the ex ante impartial selection of a unique equilibrium amongst the many possible in the repeated trust game involving the firms and its stakeholders. Note that this was its second role previously suggested (see section 5 part I, and left to this part where it is treated at length), as distinguished from the role of shaping the players' expectations so that in the ex post perspective they are able to predict the agreed solution as the result of a cognitive process of beliefs convergence to the equilibrium, which is focused on in part III, (see Sacconi, 2011 and Sacconi 2008) .
To this end (in section 2) I shall discuss at length the rehabilitation of the Rawlsian maximin principle provided by Ken Binmore's game-theoretical reformulation of the social contract (Binmore, 1984 (Binmore, , 1989 (Binmore, , 1991 (Binmore, , 1994 (Binmore, , 1998 (Binmore, , 2005 .
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Contrary to the belief that Rawls's view was utopian, it is shown that the maximin principle provides the best account of the social contract under the assumption that in a 'state of nature' any agreement on principles for institutions must be self-sustainable. In other words, to be self-sustainable and incentive-compatible, the agreement must be egalitarian, or in the best interest of the worst-off player.
Such an unconventional result has overarching implications also for the constitutional contract on the firm's governance and control structures. This is a theory to make sense of the idea of extended fiduciary duties put forward in previous works (Sacconi, 1997 (Sacconi, , 2000 (Sacconi, , 2006a (Sacconi, ,b, 2007 . Its main point was that the stakeholders' constitutional agreement (seen as the rational solution of an original bargaining game) will complement the efficient control structure with further social responsibilities toward non-controlling stakeholders, enabling them to participate in the surplus created by joint production through a redress rule against the abuse of authority (section 3). However, when a constitutional bargaining situation is considered such that the only feasible constitutions are allocations of exclusive property and control rights, a strong imbalance of bargaining power is inevitable, so that asymmetry in the final surplus distribution will reflect the asymmetry of decision rights. Then, an outcome corresponding to the arrangement of rights (ownership and control rights plus redress rights with the attached fiduciary duties) that immunizes non-controlling stakeholders against abuse of authority, and gives them an opportunity to participate in the surplus created by joint production, may not belong in the equilibrium space of the constitutional choice game (section 4). This means that the outcome of such a redress mechanism cannot be obtained in equilibrium (violating the self-sustainability condition).
The idea is that each constitution corresponds to a set of feasible (equilibrium) outcomes, and each of them comprises a post-constitutional bargaining solution within its feasible set of outcomes. Different constitutions -as they allocate rights of control to one player or another -will have post-constitutional bargaining solutions differently favorable to one or another player, but not equally favorable to all. Agreement at the constitutional stage selects the allocation of exclusive rights of ownership and control endowed with the most efficient post-constitutional solution in terms of incentives for the accomplishment of specific investments and in terms of wealth maximization. Players who forgo control in order to make agreement on the most efficient control structure possible, then need to be redressed through fiduciary duties. Implementation of such duties is an outcome coinciding with an equitable compromise (a linear combination) of the post-constitutional rational solutions preferred by different stakeholders as they relate to different allocations of rights, some in favor of one stakeholder, some in favor of another. But when the assumption is made that the only feasible outcomes (corresponding to equilibria) are those
